Introduction
According to the José Alencar Gomes da Silva National Cancer Institute 1 commonly known by its acronym, INCA, cervical cancer is the second most prevalent form of cancer among women in Brazil, associated with the deaths of some 4,986 women in 2010 and responsible for 17,540 new cases in 2012 2 . Estimates suggest that the Pap testing of asymptomatic women between the ages of 25 and 64, followed by treatment of detected lesions, could reduce the mortality rate by around 80%. This would require a population screening program and guaranteed follow-up of cases presenting any level of positive results. In developing nations it is especially common to offer this screening test only to women who seek out health, while there is no strategy for ensuring that the most vulnerable women, namely poor women, will have the test and, if necessary, receive treatment 3 .
Population screening requires a structured program of regular testing of an asymptomatic population displaying greater risk factors in order to identify precursor or cancerous lesions in their initial stages. To be effective, such a program must cover at least 70% of the target population and, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), an expensive, logistically complex program is only justified if: the type of cancer is epidemiologically significant, its asymptomatic phase is long enough to allow for detection, a significant percentage of precursor lesions develop into the disease, treatment is available to improve prognosis, and the screening test is accepted by patients and available at a reasonable cost 4 .
Our research offers a historical analysis of the construction of the technical, scientific, and management tools indispensable to this type of initiative, while it also discusses data about the more general political framework and associated social movement in Brazil. In this regard, our article contextualizes the topic within the broader study of Brazilian public policy.
Public policy definitions and analysis models can be wide-ranging. According to Atwood and collaborators 5 decision making and the implementation of public health policy is often led by crises, political considerations, and the mobilization of public opinion, triggering interdependence between medical and scientific knowledge and political and social context. Our investigation attempts to identify the actors, scenarios, and settings of the Viva Mulher program. In analyzing the program and its evolution from pilot project through subsequent campaigns, it is important to understand the conflicts and shifts between the Ministry of Health and INCA and the contribution of the social movement and the successive political and electoral contexts that, to differing degrees, played a part in building this pioneer public health policy for cancer control in Brazil.
Early initiatives
The first population screening programs for cervical cancer began in regions of the United States in the 1950s 6 . In Europe, Norway created such a program in 1959, with Denmark following suit the next year. In the 1960s, a number of Nordic countries implemented similar programs and by 1966 cervical cancer screening was part of England's National Health Service 7 . At that time, the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) cited cervical cancer as an important public health problem in Latin America; after ascertaining that only limited preventive actions were being undertaken, the organization proposed that specific programs be developed to control the disease, based on mass screening using the Pap smear test 8 .
The 1960s saw some initiatives to apply the method in Brazil. Cervical cancer prevention efforts were then starting to move beyond doctor's offices and specialized hospitals to find their place in the public healthcare network. Established in 1956 in the city of Rio de Janeiro (former capital of Brazil), the Social Pioneers Foundation (Fundação das Pioneiras Sociais) was a philanthropic organization very active in education and health, especially in the field of chronic degenerative diseases and particularly those associated with female cancers. In the area of cervical cancer, the organization made several pertinent contributions directed at problems that still stand as central, challenging issues in the control of this kind of cancer in Brazil, especially in relation to fostering engagement with lower-class women (who find it harder both to grasp medical information and to obtain access to healthcare services) and in guaranteeing the quality of cytological tests 9 .
As regards the first matter, the Social Pioneers Foundation extended its activities to ten Brazilian states, creating not only specialized hospitals and, in Rio de Janeiro, a research center, but mobile hospitals as well as part of its «Health on Wheels» program, which included floating hospital units in the Amazon. As far as ensuring the reliability of the Pap smear is concerned, the first official cytopathology school was established in 1968 to provide suitable training for the technicians who had the strategic role of taking the first readings of test slides 10 .
In 1965, under the leadership of the Universidade Estadual de Campinas' Department of Gynecology and Obstetrics and in accordance with PAHO guidelines, a Cervical Cancer Control Program was set up in the city of Campinas, São Paulo. It was Brazil's first experience with broad-reaching, continuous ongoing action. In ten years, not only did the program reach By 1972, Brazil had spent eight years under a political dictatorship that took a liberal approach to economics. Grounded on this liberalism and on privatism, the predominant healthcare model enforced a merely curative approach to chronic degenerative disease, and the counterpart to the costly and not highly efficient process of equipping hospitals technologically was disregarded and preventive initiatives unattended 13 . That year Brazil received its first manuals of PAHO technical recommendations and the Ministry of Health drew up its National Cancer Control Plan (Plano Nacional de Controle de Câncer, or PNCC), which was launched countrywide in September 1973. Among its goals was the expansion of cervical cancer preventive actions through the Pap smear and the organization of a national network to control the disease. 14 In 1975, the state of São Paulo's Center for Oncology Research Foundation (Fundação Centro de Pesquisa em Oncologia, or FCPO) introduced a statewide cervical cancer prevention program that encompassed state and municipal health posts, some private doctors' offices, and mobile testing units (buses and train cars) 15 .
By the mid-1980s, Brazil's healthcare model for cervical cancer had only allowed for prevention and early detection measures in the form of isolated, sporadic, non-nationwide initiatives carried out by certain institu-tions -generally philanthropic ones-or by health departments, usually municipal. In 1985, it was estimated that the cytological test for cervical cancer had reached only 2% of Brazil's female population 16 .
In 1984, against a backdrop of political re-democratization and the re-emergence of the social movement, the Integral Program for Women's Healthcare (Programa de Atenção Integral à Saúde da Mulher, or PAISM) was created, which included cervical and uterine cancer prevention and control. endorsed by the Ministry of Health -for example, a target age range of 25 to 60 and a three-year screening interval after two negative results 20 . By the end of the 1980s, Brazilian women were enjoying greater citizenship status and much had been achieved in the production of scientific and epidemiological knowledge. Combined with various local and national experiences, this stimulated the demand for cervical cancer to be addressed in an organized fashion and at a nationwide level. In addition, Brazilian health services had undergone a structural change. In 1988, the new Constitution had proclaimed health a «right for all and a duty of the State» 21 and in 1990, the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde, or SUS) was created under Law no. 8080, laying the instrumental basis for ongoing actualization of this newly attained right. This new environment promoted the changes observed in the control of cervical cancer during the course of the 1990s.
Pilot project
The aforementioned context aside, Brazil had no prior experience implementing a national program for secondary prevention of any type of disease prior to the 1990s. Moreover, Brazil's sharp regional differences in terms of socioeconomics, geography, climate, and epidemiology tend to discourage attempts to set up a nationwide program with any singularly defined, rigid features.
With these obstacles in mind, and with the goal of collecting data on the Brazilian healthcare networks in order to help develop a broader strategy, in municipalities of Brazil. Hubs were created in Curitiba, capital of Paraná, in January; in March, they reached Brasilia and smaller cities in the Federal District (Tabatinga, Ceilândia, and Samambaia); Recife, Pernambuco; and districts in Rio de Janeiro's West Side (Campo Grande, Bangu, and Santa Cruz); in April, Belém, Pará; and in January 1998, the state of Sergipe -thus spreading services over five of the country's macro-regions. Viva Mulher sought to lower the incidence of the disease and its mortality rate by expanding access to cytopathology testing, first and foremost for women at greater risk, and also by guaranteeing adequate treatment of the disease and its precursor lesions in 100% of cases. The program's target population was women aged 35 to 49; and a total of 124,440 women received care, of which 3.7% presented abnormal results and 5.7% were tested for the first time ever (ranging from 1.4% in Sergipe to 9.7% in Belém) 22 .
The Ministry of Health provided direct funding for pilot project phases through both INCA and the Ary Frauzino Foundation (FAF) 23 , which facilitated management and expedited actual implementation of initiatives. In technical terms, it was vital that the project spawn intermediary products with a view to the future structuring of a country-wide program. Generally speaking, Viva Mulher's main contributions were the establishment of a model of decentralized action, the standardization of all stages of procedures (including adoption of the nomenclature that since 1993 had been endorsed by the Ministry of Health and by the Brazilian Society of Cytopathology), geographic expansion, and the definition of the recommended periodicity for Pap smears 24 .
By conducting qualitative surveys among health professionals and the female populations in question, the pilot project sought to devise communication strategies that would overcome cultural and regional resistance. It enjoyed the support of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) in preparing communication materials tailored to these groups. One of its greatest successes was probably the incorporation of the At the same time, the pilot project also revealed some critical obstacles that would have to be addressed if a national program were to be launched. It was noted, for example, that guaranteeing the quality of test results would depend on the monitoring of external laboratories; software would have to be more user-friendly and, primarily, compatible with SUS systems; funding mechanisms would have to be found for ambulatory procedures; and managers would have to be recruited for a task of this magnitude 26 .
However, in August 1998, before the pilot project was concluded and its results analyzed, the Ministry of Health took over responsibility for the control of cervical cancer in Brazil, through a broad national campaign that became known as the «intensification phase» -a move that constituted a kind of surreptitious intrusion. Perhaps the euphemism «intensification phase» was meant to suggest that this action had been planned all along and that a new phase had already been in the making, aimed at geographic expansion of the Viva Mulher pilot project. If such were the case, the initiative should not have come at a moment when most of the pilot activities had been underway for a little more than one year and, in the case of the state of Sergipe (the last to implement the Viva Mulher program), for only seven months.
The Ministry of Health presented the proposal for the national campaign to the Intersectoral Commission on Women's Health (Comissão Intersetorial de Saúde da Mulher, or CISMU), an advisory board to the National Health Council (Conselho Nacional de Saúde, or CNS). Arguments against the idea were raised during subsequent discussions. There was concern that ground might be lost in the effort to enforce a paradigm of integral health care for women, since the Ministry would go back to working towards the solution of one specific problem, as well as a fear that the SUS would be unable to handle the expected large influx of women, who would then find themselves without treatment 27 . Among the matters discussed at its August 1998 meeting, the CNS expressed its apprehension about the 25 Hildoberto Carneiro de Oliveira, professor from the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) and former chairman of the Brazilian Federation of Societies of Gynecology and Obstetrics (Febrasgo), was of the same opinion: «They rushed to launch the campaign -possibly for political reasons» 32 .
In addition to these opinions from specialists, the newspaper wrote that sources said «the ministry also had allegedly received a PAHO report criticizing the launching of the campaign». «The ministry denied this information», Folha stated further on in the same article 33 .
Contested by the technical group responsible for coordination of Viva Mulher and by the leadership of INCA itself -all in frank disagreement with him-and also finding himself facing opposition from both Brazilian and foreign experts, the Health Minister spoke to Folha: «Health Minister José Serra says he considers the criticisms of experts "the poppycock of people on the outside". According to him, the prevention campaign will only help and will take the problem [of cervical cancer] to women: "This can in no way hurt". The ministry said it would "be entirely able to" finalize all stages of the prevention program. "This is a program with a beginning, a middle -and it only has no end because we intend to continue it", says Paulo Kalume, with the National Program to Fight him, "the ministry has mapped out a number of regions in the country for organizing the campaign» 34 .
These blatant disagreements over the campaign execution were cut short by a show of strength on the part of the Health Minister, who, a few days later, dismissed the director of INCA, leading to the resignation of his appointed staff. In counterpart -and the misgivings cited earlier notwithstanding-the ministry received the support of the National Health Council 35 .
First campaign or first intensification phase
The Health Ministry's intervention in the Viva Mulher pilot project does not appear to have stemmed from any criticism about the work INCA had done on the project up until then or from any technical discrepancies. As suggested earlier, the reasons behind it seem instead related to matters of a more general political nature and to a logic lying outside the field of cancer control.
In September 1995, the United Nations had held the Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and Peace, in Beijing, China. Present at the event were 189 governments and over 5,000 representatives of 2,100 NGOs from around the world. For two years, the women's movement in Brazil had worked with over 800 women's groups in preparation for the event, and the country proved an active participant. also sent a 25 member delegation to the event itself, led by the First Lady, Ruth Cardoso 36 . The main topics addressed in Beijing were: advances in human rights for women; women and poverty; women and decision-making; female children; and violence against women. There were two health priorities: the prevention and promptly treatment of gynecological cancers, and family planning. The head of the Brazilian delegation committed the nation to working to change the reality of cervical cancer. The personal and intense involvement of the wife of the President of Brazil strengthened the links between the federal government and the women's movement, fueling an expectation for greater female participation in public policy making in Brazil, including the health area 37 .
In the worlds of Nelson Cardoso de Almeida, an important manager during Viva Mulher program: «The Viva Mulher program was a response to demands by former First Lady Ruth Cardoso, with former INCA director Marcos Moraes. She wanted a strong cervical cancer control program because she had taken on this commitment at the International Women's Conference in China. She herself was under pressure from the organized women's movement, and passed this pressure along upon her return to Brazil. The project was born, but not, it doesn't seem to me, at the pace the government had hoped for. In a nation this size, it's very hard to lay a solid foundation across the whole country. I think that at some point, [there came] the realization that the natural course of the Viva Mulher program, the way it was being conducted, would take longer than expected. So it was decided to wage a major national initiative to mobilize women and municipal and state governments to join in the process» 38 . In 1998 -the year Brazil's president was on the campaign trail, taking advantage of the new right to re-election within the executive branch that had been granted under a Constitutional amendment-the Ministry of Health apparently decided to use the opportunity to respond loud and clear to the pledge made in Beijing. This decision -besides eliciting the reaction by foreign experts mentioned earlier-also generated controversy among Brazilian health professionals and academics, especially in the public health field. All warned about the weak efficacy of temporary actions and the need to create an ongoing, standardized program to control cervical cancer in Brazil 39 .
Despite these many criticisms and question marks, from August 18 to September 30, 1998, the intensification phase of Viva Mulher got underway, now under the coordination of the Ministry of Health's Department of Health Policy, with technical assistance provided by a national committee comprising representatives of diverse areas within the Ministry itself as well as from the ministries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, along with representatives from fifteen public or private institutions, such as the Catholic Church's Pastoral da Criança (Children's Ministry), the National Councils of Municipal and State Health Departments, and some scientific societies. It should be taken into account that the SUS was only ten years old at the time and that this was the country's first major nationwide experience in mobilizing public institutions and civil society 40 .
According to a Health Ministry's report, 97.9% of Brazilian municipalities (i.e., 5,389 of them) took part in the intensification phase and 3,177,740 Pap smears were done, of which 72.1% represented women from the target population. In addition to repeating the pilot project's successful strategies, and in view of its national character, this campaign (or intensification phase) sought to enact other initiatives as well, yielding positive results for the overall process 41 . Among them were the implementation of a specific electronic system for monitoring activities (Siscolo) and the consolidation of the decentralization process initiated under the pilot project, which included expansion of laboratory coverage for slide reading, the establishment of 244 centers around the country where high-frequency surgery was available, and the formation of a regional tertiary healthcare network. Considering the main factors behind disease vulnerability, the intensification phase met important goals: 38.6% of examined women had never had a Pap smear and 72.1% of the tests (according to Siscolo records only) involved women in the target age group 42 .
The slogan «Remind someone you care about» («Lembre alguém que você queira bem») became the main message of a large-scale publicity campaign, encompassing television and radio ads, billboards, posters, and flyers as well as publicity stunts in major cities, like giant pink ribbons 43 wrapped around monuments and public buildings. The campaign let Brazilian women know that they had a major commitment in August and September of that year: to have a cervical cancer prevention test.
A number of operational glitches kept the campaign from running smoothly and impeded the achievement of the planned objectives. The establishment of the electronic Siscolo system was disorganized, leading to inconsistencies in the inclusion of data by laboratories. Two weeks after the activities commenced, the proposal to focus on the 35-49 age range had to be tabled under heavy and spontaneous pressure from women seeking Pap smears at health posts: «Two weeks into the campaign, the guideline had to be thrown out and the test opened up to everyone, because women were out on the streets demonstrating. During the second campaign [to be addressed next in this article], we expanded the age range to 25 to 59 and advised the states and municipalities that we visited not to deny women the test» 44 . Since the health system was not prepared for an initiative of this magnitude, many women who responded to the campaign could not get tested, one reason being a shortage of doctors. An attempt was made to solve this problem by extending the campaign for 15 more days 45 .
The biggest problems, however, had to do with reading the slides and dealing with women whose results were positive. It was not unusual, for instance, that results were lost in the mail; that addresses were incomplete or incorrect in at least 30% of the cases, which hampering the localization of the woman and their subsequent follow-up. In addition the quality control module for the tests was not ready in time for the campaign and, surprisingly, the number of tests completed corresponded to only one-third of those recorded in the Siscolo system, limiting any quantitative data analysis 46 .
In the state of Acre, located in the North of Brazil, six months after the campaign had ended, a box was found with over one thousand slides that had never been read. The material was forwarded to INCA's laboratory and the results returned to Acre's Department of Health. Nearly one year had passed since testing, and it was extremely difficult to locate the women and give them their results: «Women would go to a health centre and when they got there, there wouldn't be any doctor to see them. She'd have a test done and wouldn't get the results. Six months later, for example, like in the state of Acre, we recovered a box of slides from the first campaign, a box with a thousand and some slides. Not a single one had been read. The tests had been done but the slides had never been stained. They came here to SITEC and were stained here, examined here, and the results returned to the women. The trouble is that one year later, it gets really hard to find a woman to give her the results» 47 .
In conclusion, the state of unpreparedness on the part of the health network, in combination with the operational complexity of a campaign that had to be completed in a month and a half, put at serious risk a contingent of 12,125 women with positive diagnoses for high-grade precursor lesions or for cancer, and a strategy had to be devised for handling these cases. The Ministry of Health swiftly responded by giving the coordination of the cervical cancer control program back to the INCA, together with the responsibility for locating and providing treatment to the thousands of affected women.
According to the majority of public health managers and social leaders interviewed, the most successful facet of this phase was the far-reaching social communication plan, devoted to publicizing the campaign and to mobilizing women to take the test. The strategy was to get women to 46 tie a pink ribbon around their wrists, a gesture associated with trying to remember something like an important fact or date.
Consolidation phase
In November 1998, under new direction, the INCA was charged by the Ministry of Health with solving the issue of what to do about women whose results had been positive during the national campaign. But the institute was also unprepared to handle this sudden challenge, which called for considerable effort on the part of the staff at the INCA's prevention and control sector, known as CONPREV (Coordenação de Prevenção e Vigilância). The team worked under great pressure, with the Health Ministry demanding results as it in turn was admonished about its responsibility to the women mobilized by the campaign. At the end, and after almost one year of intense investigations and close communications with state and municipal health departments the result was perhaps inadequate given the matter's serious nature, but it was equally surprising, considering the conditions under which the work was done: 83% of women presenting positive results were located and treated 48 .
Starting in April 1999, the INCA tried to ensure the continuity of its first organizational accomplishments and to make further progress with the structure of Viva Mulher, incorporating the experience gained in the national campaign. This included strengthening the program's geopolitical base by signing agreements with state-level departments, adjusting protocols for follow-up of women presenting positive results, expanding human resource training at all levels of the service network, increasing the number of cytopathology laboratories and enforcing proper use of Siscolo, refining and expanding high-frequency surgery centers, and, in terms of more general national management, using the rate of cytopathology testing for cervical cancer among the female population as a measure of primary health care at the level of Brazilian municipalities 49 . A vital element for continuation of the program was the preservation of financing from the Fund for Strategic Actions and for Compensation (Fundo de Ações Estratégicas e de Compensação, or FAEC), which had been paying for exams; for each state and municipality, this funding was estimated to cover the equivalent to annual screening of 30% of resident women between the ages of 25 and 60 50 .
Ministério da

Second campaign or second intensification phase
After re-assuming management of cervical cancer control actions, and also after resolving the problems caused by the 1998 national campaign, the INCA outlined a strategy centered around two general concerns: preserving the structure mounted during the first intensification phase and investing efforts in the consolidation of a network of communications, knowledge, and services robust enough to underpin regular initiatives by the Viva Mulher program. This endeavor continued until 2001, when the Ministry of Health called for a new campaign, this time to be managed by the INCA in conjunction with an Executive Committee representing various of the ministry's technical sectors 51 , an idea that proved operationally clumsy given the lack of any real working relationship between the institute and ministerial sectors.
The second intensification phase not only could count on human resources and a material structure that had been gradually assembled since the pilot project got underway in January 1997; it also began its preparations much earlier than the first phase, allowing the INCA staff to work with health departments in more populous states and municipalities to improve their level of organization. Once again, the proposed target population was women in the 35-49 age bracket who had never had a Pap smear test or who had not had one in the past three years; the goal was to accelerate coverage of the Brazilian female population and to reach women in the highest risk group age-wise. There was an unprecedented move to coordinate work with the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), who took on the task of conducting tests among indigenous women and providing health departments with results 53 .
To attain the goal of testing 2.5 million women, and to bypass some of the hurdles encountered in the first campaign, the healthcare network was sent enough material to make the Pap smear test to respond to a 30% increase in the demand. This decision proved very successful as over 3.8 million women ended up being tested. Responding not only to women's natural interest in getting tested even if outside the target age limits, the campaign coordinators expanded the age range to 25-59 and told states and municipalities they should not deny a Pap smear to anyone requesting one 54 .
The Health Ministry's Social Communication Office (Assessoria de Comunicação Social) drew up flyers and posters and sent this material to health departments in advance in order to help mobilize women. Criticisms were lodged about the material, especially the particular female model chosen to illustrate it, as she looked nothing like the population targeted by the campaign. Radio and TV ads also ran on a number of popular programs, featuring the new Health Minister (the former Minister had stepped down to run for president) 55 .
To manage the campaign, the INCA put in place a logistics system that accompanied activities, centralized in a situation room that was in permanent contact with health department's heads through telephone and videoconferencing via satellite. Still, there were sporadic problems, such as in the city of São Gonçalo, Rio de Janeiro, where health posts failed to open on time, and in the city of Rio de Janeiro itself, which was grappling with an epidemic of dengue fever and moved the campaign to start on May 7 until June 6 of 2002:
«At the time of the second campaign, we set up a "situation room" at INCA, with people at CONPREV with their ears to the telephone. People had their ears glued to the phone all day, using those headset things. The person would spend all day just taking calls from municipalities and states. We did videoconferencing via [satellite], for municipalities where there was a signal.
[. . .] We tried to get as close as possible to those who were actually going to carry out the work» 56 .
There were no new campaigns after that. Starting in 2005, the Viva Mulher program began emphasizing the formation of the Oncological Care Network (Rede de Atenção Oncológica) 57 by providing technical assistance to health departments, upgrading Siscolo technologically (DATASUS), and defining indicators for monitoring its initiatives 58 .
Conclusion
Like other chronic diseases, cancer requires complex and continuous health action involving different levels of the health system. Although cervical cancer has long been a public health problem in Brazil, a number of factors delayed the adoption of a proper program for addressing it. In more general terms, the main hindrance was the health model in place prior to the enactment of the (SUS), which granted universal access of the population to a network of health services with different levels of complexity. In this scenario, only a small portion of the population -government workers and those employed in the formal market-had access to health services at different levels of complexity. The Ministry of Health, still heedless of the epidemiological changes in course in Brazil, took charge of controlling the so-called «major endemic diseases», which comprised an array of infectious illnesses that did not include any chronic degenerative disease, like cancer.
Furthermore, the country's technical and assistance model directed funds and efforts almost exclusively toward the incorporation of heavy technology, especially in the hospital environment and in the practice of «super specialties» 59 . In such a context, issues like health promotion, prevention measures, and early detection of cancer received little objective support. The absence of any commitment to basic public health action was also made manifest in the priorities chosen for addressing disease problems and in the lack of any conceptual link between health and development.
Nine years after health care became a right under Brazil's 1988 Constitution, and seven years after the INCA's foundation, the institute launched a pilot project aimed at future construction of a cervical cancer control program in Brazil. Despite the urgent need to address the second most common form of cancer among women in Brazil, the lack of basic structural conditions combined with inexperience in setting up nationwide programs led to the adoption of a progressive strategy, where knowledge and experience could be acquired while working alongside state and municipal health departments. In short, it would be necessary to devise and bring to maturity a coordinated multi-stage program that could have a significant impact on the incidence and mortality rates for this kind of cancer.
In focusing on a number of Brazil's macro-regions, the Viva Mulher pilot project strove to integrate several social and cultural elements from the target population (including gender issues) with technical, scientific, and knowledge management. As one might expect, the pilot project moved forward slowly, ran into foreseen and unforeseen problems, and even had to cope with a certain incompatibility between the proposals and attitudes of Canadian consultants and those of the Brazilian personnel (although, 59. Silva Jr., n. 13. in concrete terms, the most damaging incompatibility was between an electronic system from the Canadian consultants and SUS systems).
It is hard to say how this process would have developed had it not been for the brusque intervention called the first «intensification phase». At its own pace, the Viva Mulher pilot project was in the process of identifying and implementing methods that would lay the technical foundations of a future program, when there emerged on the scene a political demand for a nationwide campaign -an opportunity whose potential contribution, in principle, only the Ministry of Health seemed to have considered.
Curiously enough, a message from the head of INCA entitled «Four Years of the Viva Mulher Program» («Quatro Anos de Programa Viva Mulher») -part of an assessment published in 2002 60 -ignored the institute's own pilot project and painted the program as wholly planned, its successive phases all intentionally laid out, in a way the facts do not seem to support.
Despite the technical and political fallout occasioned by this intervention in a process until then led by the INCA, this article has pointed some positives outcomes. After all, in the context of drafting public policy, highlighting the nonexistence, insufficiency, or inefficaciousness of screening procedures can in itself be considered a contribution to the process.
When the INCA resumed the management of the program, it moved to strengthen its relations with state health departments in hopes of forming an integrated national network, grounded in a geopolitical management core that could sustain a cervical cancer control program and its various phases of execution.
The program's guiding axis shifted progressively from emphasis on early detection to the concept of «lines of care», within the broader context of the Oncological Care Network, covering all levels of complexity: primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare service, health promotion, prevention, diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, and palliative care. Viva Mulher became a permanent program, currently targeting a population of women aged between 25 and 64. Its main focus is the provision of routine exams and the improvement of the Oncological Care Network by providing states with technical assistance, modernizing Siscolo in technological terms, monitoring indicators, and establishing agreements with health managers.
From a historical perspective, this initial analysis of Viva Mulher is meant to contribute to a debate on health action, especially the study of cervical cancer control initiatives in Brazil, as well as to the more recent understanding of cancer as a public health problem in this country. oe
